Issues of personal jurisdiction are inherently fact specific. But the First Circuit’s recent decision in Putnam v. EPR Properties, No. 25-1857 (1st Cir. Apr. 28, 2026), offers broader lessons applicable to future disputes over personal jurisdiction—both before the district court and First Circuit.
What follows is a somewhat lengthy factual recitation. With apologies to the time-crunched reader, as this case shows, arguments over personal jurisdiction can turn on a detailed assessment of facts which the plaintiff presents and uncontested facts the defendant puts forth.
Putnam, brought by two parents, stemmed from the tragic death of their five-year-old. Plaintiff Elizabeth Putnam, a citizen of Massachusetts, saw multiple advertisements for an “Ice Hotel” on the property of Hotel Valcartier in Quebec. In the fall of 2022, she sent an email to the hotel asking about how and when she could book at the hotel. And in April 2023, she pulled the trigger, booking an icy stay starting January 14, 2024. She then received regular marketing materials from the hotel and changed her reservation to add another night.
On January 12, 2024, Plaintiffs arrived at the hotel with their son. Shortly after their arrival at the brick-and-mortar hotel, an unsecured Murphy bed fell from the wall, hitting their child, causing fatal head injuries.
Plaintiffs then filed a wrongful-death suit in Federal District Court in Massachusetts against two defendants, Premier Parks, LLC, (“Premier”) and EPR Properties (“EPR”) who Plaintiffs alleged were the hotel’s owner and operator, respectively. Plaintiffs further alleged that Premier and EPR (both out-of-state entities) systematically marketed the Hotel Valcartier to residents of Massachusetts. Each Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Defendants’ Proffered Facts
Each Defendant submitted sworn statements supporting their motion to dismiss. EPR submitted an affidavit from its director of asset management asserting that EPR did not own the Hotel Valcartier, but rather, had ownership interests in subsidiary entities that own various properties, such as the hotel. Neither EPR nor its subsidiaries had anything to do with marketing for the hotel, he stated.
Premier submitted a declaration by its CFO. She stated that Premier did not advertise in Massachusetts and never solicited business in Massachusetts. She did not, however, expressly state that Premier did not operate the hotel.
Plaintiffs’ Evidence in Opposition
Plaintiffs opposed the motions with a raft of communications and publicly available documents, including: a company statement about the acquisition of the hotel; an excerpt from a 10-K filing; screen shots of a list of EPR’s real estate portfolio from its website; a statement on Premier’s website; a public filing in the Business Register in Quebec; a LinkedIn Post by Premier; a job posting by Premier; and a screenshot of Premier’s website.
Premier’s Declaration on Reply
Premier supported its reply brief with a declaration from its CEO, Kieran Burke. Burke averred that Premier never owned, operated, or managed the hotel. Burke further declared that all the operational, managerial, and advertising services for the hotel were handled by another entity, VVV.
The district court held argument on the motions, dismissing the claims with prejudice and denying Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery.
The First Circuit’s Decision
The First Circuit reversed, in part, and remanded (long-time readers of this blog will recognize former blog author and now Judge Dunlap as the author of the court’s opinion). Applying the prima facie approach, the court accepted Plaintiffs’ properly documented evidentiary proffers and, to the extent they were uncontested, jurisdictional facts proffered by the Defendants. The court emphasized that under the prima facie analysis it was bound to accept Plaintiffs’ facts as true, but that Defendants’ facts only became part of the mix if they were uncontested.
The court reviewed the district court’s decision to deny jurisdictional discovery for an abuse of discretion.
In reviewing the facts alleged in the Complaint, the court had little problem dispensing with them—they were made in conclusory fashion, which does not suffice under the prima facie standard.
So the court turned to the facts and documents Plaintiffs submitted with their opposition motions. In doing so, it addressed a threshold issue: Whether it could even consider such unauthenticated evidence. The court found that when the Plaintiffs had not yet been able to conduct discovery, Plaintiffs could rely on publicly available documents. This approach, the court noted, was like the approach taken when documents outside the pleadings are submitted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Reviewing the documents submitted by Plaintiffs, along with Burke’s declaration, the court concluded that there was a genuine conflict in the Parties’ evidentiary proffers. The court concluded that Plaintiffs evidence—its LinkedIn post, job listing, and EPR’s company statements—suggested that Premier was involved in the hotel’s operations.
And rather than refuting that inference, Burke’s declaration only confused the issue. The court noted that Burke’s declaration was made in his capacity as Premier’s CEO. Burke’s declaration, the First Circuit noted, must be based on personal knowledge. Such personal knowledge extended to personal knowledge of the operating company as well. Thus, the circuit court concluded that “[b]y proffering a declaration in his capacity as Premier’s CEO, Burke appears to be asserting ‘personal knowledge’ of [the operating company’s] activities in that capacity.” Slip. Op. at 20. As such, the declaration, taken together with plaintiff’s evidence suggesting Premier’s involvement, raised the inference that Premier may be involved in the hotel’s operations, thus permitting jurisdictional discovery. In determining otherwise, the district court abused its discretion.
The First Circuit reached a different conclusion as to EPR. The court found that, at most, Plaintiffs cast doubt on whether EPR did not own the hotel. That fact, however, did not get them as far as they needed to go. Plaintiffs had to also allege facts justifying personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts, which could not be based on owning a Quebec hotel. And Plaintiffs failed to rebut EPR’s evidence that it was not involved at all in the hotel’s marketing efforts. The court noted, however, that the district court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against EPR with prejudice. Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction should have been without prejudice.
Lessons From Putnam
Putnam offers insight into facts that are both sufficient (Premier) and insufficient (EPR) to unlock jurisdictional discovery.
For A Plaintiff
While the court easily dismissed conclusory allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint, it examined in detail the many documents Plaintiffs submitted in their effort to establish jurisdiction. Ultimately, at least with Premier, these documents proved to be decisive. For any plaintiff seeking to establish jurisdiction, Putnam provides a roadmap. In today’s world, a company may publicly broadcast its operations in various ways: LinkedIn, job postings, 10-K filings, press releases, filings with the government. That these documents may be not authenticated is of no moment. All these sources and others have the potential to provide just enough of a hook to unlock jurisdictional discovery. Any plaintiff wishing to establish jurisdiction should mine the public record for facts relevant to establishing jurisdiction. Sufficient internet sleuthing might be enough to either convince a district court to allow for discovery. Or, as in Putnam, persuade the circuit court that dismissal without such discovery was an abuse of discretion.
Putnam further shows that, armed with enough facts, a Plaintiff can prevail on appeal, even facing the uphill battle of an abuse-of-discretion standard. The circuit court’s deep analysis of specific facts Plaintiffs proffered shows that, in applying the prima facie approach, specific facts can make all the difference.
For A Defendant
As often is the case with supporting affidavits or declarations, a party is usually inclined to go as close to the top of an entity as possible. A high-level executive, is likely to be more persuasive than a low-level employee, the thought usually goes. But Premier’s declarant was the man who knew too much. His personal knowledge into the operations of an affiliate operating company created the inference of intermingling. Putnam thus teaches to carefully think about the role and personal knowledge of such a high-level executive. It is hard to know if a declaration by an operational manager of Premier could have been a difference maker. Maybe such a person’s lack of knowledge about the operating company would have changed the analysis. But, even if not outcome determinative, the Putnam court’s scrutiny of the declaration and the ambit of the declarant’s personal knowledge shows that much care and thought should be given to who provides a declaration and what he or she says within the personal-jurisdiction context.
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The next personal-jurisdiction case will have wildly different facts than a tragic trip to an ice hotel. But the First Circuit’s decision in Putnam is instructive for personal-jurisdiction cases of all temperatures.
This post was authored by Jack Woodcock.
